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PULLING THE IVY OUT OF THE WINDOWS:  
PRESUMPTIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE HOME AND R v. GOMBOC
Tipper McEwan*
INTRODUCTION
Ivy is a beautiful plant.  Its green leaves brighten up the side of a house and pictur-­‐‑
esquely connect buildings to landscapes.  Ivy is also a useful plant: the leaves naturally 
act  as  a  first  line  of  defence  against  the  elements,  and  in  the  spring  and  fall  they  absorb  
the  punishment  of  the  wind  and  rain.    They  help  keep  a  house  cool  in  the  summer  and  
warm  in  the  winter.    But  ivy  can  also  harm  the  house  that  it  should  adorn  and  protect.  
From  a  single  seed,  it  grows  quickly  and  aggressively.    If  the  mortar  or  bricks  of  the  
wall  are  too  so ,  ivy  will  slowly  dig  into  the  wall  and  undermine  it.    If  any  wood  is  
exposed,  ivy  will  put  roots  into  it,  and  slowly  split  into  the  grain  of  the  wood.    If  le   
unchecked,  it  will  overwhelm  the  house  beneath  a  multiplicity  of  spreading  tendrils.  
The   law  of   search  and  seizure   is   like   ivy  growing  on  Canadians’  homes.      It   should  
both connect the home to the greater landscape, by providing a means of balancing 
the rights of individuals against the concerns of the state, and protect the rights of 
Canadians to enjoy privacy in their own homes.  More than any other place, the home 
is where Canadians can be themselves.  Section 8 of the Charter  reads:  “Everyone  has  
the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.”1  However, the juris-­‐‑
prudential  ivy  that  has  sprung  from  this  seed  has  worked  its  way  into  the  wood  and  
walls of Canadian homes.  Judicial analysis under s. 8 has grown more complex, and 
Canadians’ expectations that they will enjoy privacy in their own homes have been 
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University.    He  also  holds  a  BA  (Honours)  and  a  MA  from  Queen’s  University  in  English  Literature.    
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1  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 98, being Schedule B of the 
Canada Act 98 (U.K.), 1982, c.11, s. 8 [Charter].
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buried  under  a  thicket  of  vines  and  leaves.    Some  pruning  is  in  order.  
From the origins of the common law, the home has been a presumptively private place. 
Sir  Edward  Coke  famously  held  that  “the  house  of  everyone  is  to  him  as  his  castle  and  
fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence as for his repose.”2  This 
passage was quoted in R. v. Tessling, but ultimately it was not enough to sway the result 
of that case.3  
Today in Canada the law of search and seizure presumes that nothing is automati-­‐‑
cally within the protection of s. 8.  The power of the state to search the home is limited 
only  by  the  existence  of  a  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  (“REP”).    Where  there  is  a  
REP, neither the government nor the police can search for either physical evidence or 
information without a warrant or some other form of prior judicial authorization.4  In 
other  words,  the  law  does  not  recognize  that  a  search  has  taken  place  unless  there  was  
a REP.  However, if there is a REP in a place or in certain information, then whatever 
was done by the state to gain the information was a search.  A search without a warrant 
is presumptively unreasonable.5  
From   the   seed  of   the  REP  has   grown  a   tangled  mass   of   factors   and   sub-­‐‑factors   for  
evaluating the reasonableness of expectations of privacy.  A REP is determined by an 
analysis of all the circumstances.  The subjective expectation of the person whose home 
is searched is only one factor in the analysis.6  However, the Supreme Court of Canada 
(“SCC”)  has  repeatedly  held  that  it  can  be  presumed  that  Canadians  subjectively  ex-­‐‑
pect what goes on in their homes to be private.7  What Canadians actually expect to be 
private – their homes – and what the REP analysis says they can expect to be private 
are  two  very  different  things.    The  REP  analysis  as  it  stands  gives  Canadians  less  pri-­‐‑
vacy than the jurisprudence says they expect.  The ivy has come through the windows, 
but  why?    
Various scholars argue that the REP analysis erodes Canadians’ privacy through circu-­‐‑
lar reasoning, by protecting privacy in a post-facto,  case-­‐‑by-­‐‑case  fashion,  and  by  taking  
too  narrow  an  approach  to  the  kinds  of  information  that  should  be  kept  private.     In 
R. v. Gomboc, a majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal held that the data gathered by 
placing  a  digital  recording  ammeter  (“DRA”)  on  the  accused’s  power  line  was  subject  
to  a  REP,  with  O’Brien  J.A.  dissenting.8  The Crown appealed to the SCC as of right, and 
2  Semayne’s Case,  77  Eng.  Rep.  194,  at  195,  5  Co.  Rep.  91a,  at  91b  (K.B.  1604).  
3     R. v. Tessling,  2004  SCC  67,  [2004]  3  S.C.R.  432,  at  para.  22,  3  C.R.  (6th)  207  [Tessling].
4     Hunter v. Southam Inc.,  [1984]  2  S.C.R.  145,  at  159-­‐‑160,  162,  14  C.C.C.  (3d)  97  [Hunter].
5  Ibid.  at  161.    
6     R. v. Edwards,  [1996]  1  S.C.R.  128  at  para.  45,  45  C.R.  (4th)  307  [Edwards], Tessling, supra  note  3  at  
para.  32.
7  R. v. Patrick,  2009  SCC  17,  [2009]  1  S.C.R.  579,  at  para.  37,  64  C.R.  (6th)  1  [Patrick];  Tessling, ibid. at 
para.  41.
8  R. v. Gomboc,  2009  ABCA  276,  at  paras.  26-­‐‑27,  33  and  95,  2009  CarswellAlta  1250,  [Gomboc].  
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the appeal will tentatively be heard on May 19, 2010.9  
The majority of the Court of the Appeal implicitly presumed that there is a REP in the 
home.  This presumption should be adopted as part of the law of search and seizure, 
because it answers each of the scholarly critiques and, more importantly, because it 
closes the gap between the privacy Canadians expect and the privacy the law gives them. 
I. REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY: THE CASES
The  REP  jurisprudence  started  off  simple  enough.    However,  as  the  number  of  factors  
for assessing the REP multiplied, the test became increasingly objective.  Courts contin-­‐‑
ued to recognize that Canadians subjectively expected a high level of privacy in their 
own homes, and that the home was a place worthy of s. 8 protection.  However, these 
axioms  proved  insufficient  to  establish  an  REP;  they  were  simply  overwhelmed  as  the  
objective factors in the analysis multiplied.  Eventually, the expectation of privacy in 
the home ostensibly held by everyone disappeared beneath the leaves and branches of 
objectivity.  
Hunter v. Southam Inc., the start of the REP jurisprudence, established four core princi-­‐‑
ples relevant to determining the extent of a privacy interest in the home.  One, s. 8 only 
protects  a  REP;  if  there  is  no  REP,  there  is  no  search  and  thus  s.  8  does  not  apply.    Two,  
s. 8 protects people, not places.  Three, s. 8 may protect more interests than privacy, but 
it  goes  “at  least  that  far.”    Four,  a  warrantless  search  is  prima  facie  unreasonable  where  
obtaining a warrant would be feasible.10  
The second principle – that s. 8 protects people and not places – appears on its face to 
preclude the creation of a presumption of a REP in the home because the home is a 
place.  There are two responses to this critique.  First, the purpose of this principle was 
originally to extend the law of search and seizure beyond its ancient limits in the com-­‐‑
mon law of trespass and to broaden the scope of s. 8 protection to protect more than 
the right to enjoy property.11  It would be perverse if the expansion of s. 8 protection be-­‐‑
yond  property  rights  to  “guarantee  a  broad  and  general  right  to  be  secure  from  search  
and seizure” prevented s. 8 jurisprudence from creating a presumption that would 
protect a person’s home.12    Second,  a  home  is  by  definition  a  place  where  a  person  re-­‐‑
sides.  In R. v. A.M.,13  discussed  below,  Justice  Binnie’s  minority  judgment  recognized  
that a person’s association with a particular object or space is enough to support a REP 
9     Supreme  Court  of  Canada,  Bulletin  of  Proceedings,  September  25,  2009,  at  1245.    For  
the  tentative  date  see:  h p://www.scc-­‐‑csc.gc.ca/case-­‐‑dossier/cms-­‐‑sgd/hear-­‐‑aud  eng.
aspx?ya=2010&ses=03&sr=Search
10  Hunter, supra  note  4  at  158-­‐‑159,  160-­‐‑1.
11  Ibid.  at  157-­‐‑159.
12  Ibid. at 158.  
13   R. v. A.M.,  [2008]  1  S.C.R.  569,  2008  SCC  19,  at  para.  48,  55  C.R.  (6th)  314  [A.M.].
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even when that person is elsewhere.14 
In R. v. Plant,15 a majority of the SCC held that electricity consumption records accessed 
by  a  police  computer  network  were  not  covered  by  a  REP.    The  majority  reasoned  as  
follows:
In fostering the underlying values of dignity, integrity and autonomy, it is 
fi ing  that  s.  8  of  the  Charter  should  seek  to  a  protect  biographical  core  of  
personal information which individuals in a free and democratic society 
would wish to maintain and control from dissemination to the state.  This 
would include information which tends to reveal intimate details of the 
lifestyle and personal choices of the individual.16
The majority held that electricity consumption records did not contain the information 
concerning the accused’s biographical core, and therefore that there was no REP in 
the information.17  The concept of a biographical core continues to bedevil s. 8 juris-­‐‑
prudence.  However, one would hope that the protection of s. 8 would extend beyond 
the  biographical  core.    A  person  may  keep  core  biographical  information  wri en  in  a  
diary, but that does not mean that a REP would be violated if the police entered his or 
her home and thumbed through the copies of Maclean’s magazine  on  the  kitchen  table.  
The  flowers  of  dignity,  integrity  and  autonomy  can  only  bloom  if  they  are  given  a  place  
to grow.  In Canada, the home is the place where these values bloom.  If the home is not 
a  private  place,  then  how  much  autonomy  can  a  person  really  have?      
 The totality of the circumstances test was laid out by the Court in Edwards.  The factors 
identified  by  the  Court  were:  
(i)  presence  at  the  time  of  the  search;   
(ii)  possession  or  control  of  the  property  or  place  searched;   
(iii)  ownership  of  the  property  or  place;   
(iv)  historical  use  of  the  property  or  item;   
(v) the ability to regulate access, including the right to admit or exclude 
others  from  the  place; 
(vi)  the  existence  of  a  subjective  expectation  of  privacy;  and   
(vii) the objective reasonableness of the expectation.18 
Although  only  factor  (vi)  could  truly  be  labeled  “subjective,”  this  test  at  least  superfi-­‐‑
cially placed subjective expectations and objective reasonableness on the same level of 
importance.   
14   Ibid.  at  para.  48.
15  R v. Plant,  [1993]  3  S.C.R.  281,  84  C.C.C.  (3d)  203  [Plant].
16   Ibid.  at  293.
17  Ibid.  at  295-­‐‑6.
18  Edwards, supra  note  6  at  para.  45.      
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In Tessling the Court held that there was no REP in the heat emanations from the ac-­‐‑
cused’s  home.    Police  flew  by  the  house  with  an  infrared  camera,  called  a  FLIR.19  While 
the Court was careful to point out that Plant did not limit the scope of a REP to the 
“biographical  core,”  it  ultimately  held  that  the  FLIR  did  not  intrude  into  a  “biographi-­‐‑
cal  core”  or  reveal  “intimate  details  of  [the  accused’s]  lifestyle.”20  The tension between 
these  two  positions  plays  out  in  the  subsequent  case  law,  with  some  cases  finding  no  
REP because the information did not touch on the biographical core and others strug-­‐‑
gling  to  move  beyond  this  conceptual  framework.    
The Court also distinguished between three types of privacy: personal, territorial, and 
informational.    The  privacy  interest  at  stake  in  Tessling  was  “essentially  informational”  
but with a territorial implication.21  The Court also adapted the totality of the circum-­‐‑
stances test as follows:
1.  What  was  the  subject  ma er  of  the  FLIR  image?    
2.  Did  the  respondent  have  a  direct  interest  in  the  subject  ma er  of  the  
FLIR  image?   
3.  Did  the  respondent  have  a  subjective  expectation  of  privacy  in  the  
subject  ma er  of  the  FLIR  image?   
4.  If  so,  was  the  expectation  objectively  reasonable?    In  this  respect,  
regard must be had to: 
a.  the  place  where  the  alleged  “search”  occurred;   
b.  whether  the  subject  ma er  was  in  public  view;   
c.  whether  the  subject  ma er  had  been  abandoned;   
d. whether the information was already in the hands of third 
parties, and if so, whether it was subject to an obligation of 
confidentiality; 
e. whether the police technique was intrusive in relation to the 
privacy  interest;   
f. whether the use of surveillance technology was itself 
objectively  unreasonable;   
g.  whether  the  FLIR  heat  profile  exposed  any  intimate  details  
of the respondent’s lifestyle, or information of a biographical 
nature.22
The factors in this test show an increased focus on whether or not a subjective ex-­‐‑
pectation was objectively reasonable.  A full seven points of inquiry on the objective 
side of the analysis are now weighed against a single question on the subjective side 
of the analysis.  However, the Court held that it can be presumed that a person has a 
subjective expectation of privacy in information regarding what goes on inside the 
19  Tessling, supra note  3  at  paras.  1-­‐‑3.
20  Ibid.  at  paras.  25-­‐‑26,  62.
21  Ibid.  at  paras.  20,  24.    
22  Ibid.  at  paras.  31-­‐‑32.    
88     Pulling the Ivy Out of the Windows Vol. 19
home.23  This presumption was repeated in Patrick.24  The Court in Tessling also noted 
that the territorial privacy interest in one’s home was most worthy of protection be-­‐‑
cause   it   is  “the  place  where  our  most   intimate  and  private  activities  are  most   likely  
to  take  place.”25  This point recognizes that Canadians expect that their homes will be 
uniquely private spaces.  
The universal expectation of privacy in the home and the high level of protection 
awarded to this expectation are not enough to create a REP.  The Court in Tessling 
emphasized that the s. 8 analysis must balance individual privacy interests against the 
public interest in security.26  The SCC treated the search in Tessling as a search for infor-­‐‑
mation about the home, and not as a search of the home itself.  Accordingly, the Court 
centered  its  objective  analysis  on  the  nature  and  the  quality  of  the  information  at  stake,  
since the information revealed by the FLIR was, by itself, meaningless.27  Therefore the 
information did not trench on a REP largely because it did not reveal any part of the 
accused’s biographical core.28  
On  the  other  hand,  the  Court  took  pains  to  declare  that  the  subjective  expectation  of  
privacy was a normative standard, and that an expectation of privacy was not lost 
simply because a person subjectively feared that they might be under surveillance.29  A 
reduced  subjective  expectation  of  privacy  is  insufficient  to  lower  the  level  of  constitu-­‐‑
tional  protection  afforded  to  a  particular  privacy  interest.    One  would  expect  that  there  
would logically be a fair bit of weight given to the subjective expectation of privacy as 
well, at least where the subjective expectation is presumed as it is in cases touching the 
home.  Otherwise, the standard of privacy which the Court presumes all Canadians are 
subjectively entitled to expect as a basic social norm would be unreasonable.  It would 
be odd if a basic social norm was unreasonable.  However, the juxtaposition of the sub-­‐‑
jective expectation with a plethora of factors for determining the objective reasonable-­‐‑
ness of this expectation suggests that subjective expectations of privacy are inherently 
unreasonable  and  need  to  be  carefully,  and  objectively,  qualified.  
In essence, Tessling   suggests   that   the  weaker   the   inference   about  what   is   going   on  
in the home, the less the Charter   will   regulate   the   information-­‐‑gathering   activity.  
However, there is no corresponding decline in the subjective expectations of the ac-­‐‑
cused.  Consequently, the reasonableness analysis outweighs the expectation, and s. 
8 no longer protects information which the Court recognizes that Canadians should 
expect to be private.   
This discrepancy is all the more jarring given the minority judgment in A.M., where 
23   Ibid.  at  para.  38.
24   Patrick, supra  note  7  at  para.  37.    
25  Tessling, supra note  3  at  para.  22.    
26   Ibid. at para. 17.  
27  Ibid.  at  paras.  35-­‐‑36.  
28  Ibid.  at  paras.  36,  62-­‐‑3.
29  Ibid.  at  paras.  41-­‐‑42.
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Binnie   J.,  McLachlin  C.J.C   concurring,  held   that   information   regarding   the   contents  
of  a  backpack  could  be  the  subject  of  a  REP  because  the  contents  were  intended  to  be  
private.30    Surely  if  information  in  a  backpack  can  have  an  REP  because  it  is  intended  
to be private, then the home, too, can be subject to a presumed REP, since Canadians 
similarly intend that it will be a private space.
The  judgment  of  Binnie  J.  in  A.M. points toward reform of the REP test, at least in the 
circumstances  of  that  case.    On  the  one  hand,  his  Lordships  reasons  firmly  focused  on  
the  intention  of  A.M.  to  keep  the  contents  of  his  backpack  private,  rather  than  on  the  
fact   that   the  backpack  was   le    in  plain  view  and  was  una ended  at   the  time  of   the  
search.31    Furthermore,  Binnie  J.  offered  an  important  qualification  to  the  axiom  that  s.  
8  protects  people  and  not  places:  “My  home  is  no  less  private  when  I  am  out  than  when  
I  am  there.  When  students  le   their  backpacks  in  the  gymnasium,  they  did  not  thereby  
lose their privacy interest in the concealed contents, in my view.”32    This  qualification  
makes  room  for  a  presumption  of  a  REP  in  the  home  under  the  rubric  of  s.  8.    Finally,  
Binnie  J.  held  the  following  regarding  the  use  of  the  concept  of  the  biographical  core  
in the previous cases:
[The  concept]  was  used  as  a  useful  analytical  tool,  not  a  classification  intended  
to be conclusive of the analysis of information privacy.  Not all information 
that   fails   to  meet   the  “biographical  core  of  personal   information”   test   is  
thereby open to the police.  Wiretaps target electrical signals that emanate 
from  a  home;  yet  it  has  been  held  that  such  communications  are  private  
whether   or   not   they   disclose   core   “biographical”   information   [...].   The  
privacy of such communications is accepted because they are reasonably 
intended  by  their  maker  to  be  private.33
Despite   this  qualification,   the  concept  of   the  biographical  core  continues   to   raise   its  
head, as we shall see in the dissent in Gomboc.
Binnie  J.   in  A.M. sought to balance the need for the police to conduct searches with 
the  need  for  individual  privacy  rights.    In  the  result,  his  Lordship  suggested  striking  
the balance by adoption of the standard of reasonable suspicion, without prior judi-­‐‑
cial  authorization,  to  govern  sniff  searches.34  Countering the intention of the person 
searched   to   keep   information  private,  were:   first,   the  minimally   intrusive  nature   of  
the  sniff  search;  second,  the  fact  that  the  sniffer  dog  only  gave  a  positive  or  negative  
indication  instead  of  revealing  personal  information;  and  third,  the  evidence  that  the  
particular dog in A.M. was extremely accurate.35 
30   A.M., supra  note  13  at  paras.  67-­‐‑68.
31   Ibid.  at  para.  49.
32   Ibid.  at  para  48.  
33   Ibid.  at  para.  68  (citations  omi ed).
34   Ibid.  at  paras.  5,  12-­‐‑13.    
35   Ibid.  at  paras.    81,  83,  84.    
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Binnie  J.  also  pointed  out  that  the  “all  or  nothing”  approach  to  s.  8  jurisprudence  leaves  
both  the  police  and  the  accused  in  difficult  positions.    On  the  one  hand,  if  there  is  a  
REP, then the full wall of prior judicial authorization is required before a search can be 
taken.    If  there  is  no  REP,  the  police  action  is  completely  unregulated.36    Thus  Binnie  
J.’s solution was to adopt the standard of reasonable suspicion: absent a reasonable 
suspicion,  the  sniff  search  would  violate  s.  8.      However,  a  sniff  search  on  the  basis  of  
reasonable suspicion would not require any prior judicial authorization.37     Binnie   J.  
pointed  out  that  sniffer  dogs  could  only  be  used  when  they  were  not  needed  to  detect  
illicit drugs, if warrants were required for their use, since the police would have al-­‐‑
ready gathered the information indicating the presence of drugs.38  
This  reasoning  suggests  that  s.  8  judicial  analyses  would  be  clarified  by  an  increased  
focus on the intention of the party being searched at the REP stage, and by adopting a 
more  flexible  framework  for  determining  whether  or  not  minimally  intrusive  searches  
are reasonable.  This approach extends the privacy interests protected by s. 8 on the 
front  end  and  decreases  the  requirements  for  prior  authorization  on  the  back  end,  if  the  
context renders prior judicial authorization impractical. 
Only  one  pre-­‐‑Gomboc appellate decision squarely addressed the issue of a REP in the 
data produced by a DRA.  In R. v. Cheung,   the  Saskatchewan  Court  of  Appeal  held  
there was no REP in electrical consumption data gathered by a DRA.39  Chronologically, 
Cheung followed Tessling but preceded A.M.
In Cheung,  a  confidential  source  tipped  off  the  police  about  the  location  of  a  potential  
grow-­‐‑op.    The  source  –  a  former  police  officer  –  had  seen  individuals  unloading  gar-­‐‑
dening equipment and extension cords into a house.40  The source said the two indi-­‐‑
viduals  looked  nervous.41  The utility records examined by the police showed that elec-­‐‑
trical consumption at the house was normal.42  However, at the request of the police, 
the  utility  a ached  a  DRA  to  the  power  line  for  a  two  week  period.    The  DRA  showed  
that power consumption was much higher than normal and that the consumption was 
elevated over a ten hour period and a separate two hour period each day.  A search 
warrant was granted using this data on the basis that it was consistent with presence 
of  a  marihuana  grow-­‐‑op.43  
At  the  Saskatchewan  Court  of  Queen’s  Bench,  Smith  J.A.  held  that  there  was  a  REP  in  
the data gathered by the DRA.  In so holding, she emphasized that the DRA informa-­‐‑
tion  was  more  probative  of  the  existence  of  a  grow-­‐‑op  in  the  case  at  bar  than  the  FLIR  
36   Ibid.  at  paras.  51-­‐‑53.
37   Ibid.  at  paras.  12-­‐‑13.    
38   Ibid. at para. 9.
39   R. v. Cheung,  2007  SKCA  51,  2007  at  para.  23,  219  C.C.C.  (3d)  414  [Cheung CA].
40   R v. Cheung,  2005  SKQB  283  at  para.  11,  199  C.C.C.  (3d)  260  [Cheung QB]. 
41   Cheung CA, supra  note  39,  at  para.  4.
42   Cheung QB, supra  note  40  at  para.  13.  
43   Ibid.  at  paras.  2,  6.
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information was in Tessling.44  
Smith  J.A.  applied  the  totality  of  the  circumstances  test  at  paragraph  62  of  her  judg-­‐‑
ment,  a  brief  summary  of  which  is  as  follows:  first,  the  subject  ma er  of  the  search  was  
the  power  flowing  into  the  house,  and  that  subject  ma er  was  capable  of  supporting  an  
inference  that  there  was  a  grow-­‐‑op  in  the  house.    Second,  there  was  a  direct  interest  in  
the  subject  ma er  of  the  DRA  data  because  it  related  to  the  accused’s  home.    Third,  the  
accused had a subjective expectation of privacy both in the DRA data itself and in the 
grow-­‐‑op  activities  which  the  data  revealed.      
Smith J.A. held that the expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable for the fol-­‐‑
lowing  reasons:  first,   the   fact   that   the  place  subject   to   the  DRA  surveillance  was   the  
accused’s home was a factor, but more importantly, the information revealed by the 
DRA  was  “considerably  more  valuable  to  the  police”  than  the  FLIR  image  in  Tessling. 
Second, the data was not on public view.  Third, the data had not been abandoned. 
Fourth,  the  data  was  not  already  in  the  hands  of  third  parties;  rather  the  DRA  was  in-­‐‑
stalled  solely  at  the  request  of  the  police.    Fi h,  the  DRA  intruded  on  the  accused’s  pri-­‐‑
vacy  interest  in  his  home  and  the  grow-­‐‑op  because  it  permi ed  inferences  to  be  drawn  
about what was going on inside the home.  Finally, it was held that the DRA data did 
not reveal any part of the accused’s biographical core.45  
The Court of Appeal overturned Smith J.A. on the basis that she had erred by constru-­‐‑
ing  the  “quality  of  the  information”  analysis  in  Tessling  as  meaning  “usefulness  to  the  
police.”  It was held that the nature and the quality of the DRA information was not 
covered by a REP because it did not reveal any information that formed part of the ac-­‐‑
cused’s biographical core.46  Furthermore, it was held that the DRA was no more intru-­‐‑
sive  than  the  searches  in  Plant  and  Tessling.    Specifically,  it  was  noted  that  placing  a  box  
on  a  power  line  is  no  more  intrusive  than  searching  a  database  or  flying  over  a  house.47 
The Court made only one reference to the accused’s subjective expectation of privacy, 
agreeing that there was a subjective expectation of privacy in the data.  However the 
case was decided on the basis that the expectation was not objectively reasonable.48
The jurisprudence governing the law of search and seizure has increasingly focused on 
the objective reasonableness of any expectation of privacy.  It has wound itself up the 
walls, over the roof and through the windows.  Underneath this tangle of precedent 
and circumstance lies a single constant: courts recognize that Canadians should be en-­‐‑
titled to privacy in their own homes.  The factors in the REP analysis have eroded this 
expectation.
44   Ibid.  at  paras.  61-­‐‑63.  Madame  Justice  Smith  was  appointed  to  the  Saskatchewan  Court  of  Appeal  
a er  hearing  of  the  case  but  before  her  wri en  decision  was  rendered.    The  decision  is  signed  by  
“Gene  Anne  Smith,  J.A.”.
45   Ibid.  at  para.  62.
46   Cheung CA., supra note  39  at  para.  20.    
47   Ibid. at para. 21.  
48 Ibid. at para. 19.
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II. REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY: THE CRITIQUES 
The REP analysis has been criticized for having a circular methodology and for too nar-­‐‑
rowly  considering  both  the  privacy  interests  at  stake  and  the  effects  of  any  given  case  
on the privacy rights of all Canadians.  These critiques explain how the objective fac-­‐‑
tors in the REP analysis have overwhelmed the subjective expectations of Canadians.   
1. Circularity 
The REP analysis has been criticized as a circular test both for allowing end runs around 
s.  8  and  for  defining  privacy  tautologically.    
Luther criticizes Tessling and Cheung CA on the basis that they permit the police to 
gather  information  at  will  for  the  purposes  of  ge ing  a  warrant  as  long  as  the  infor-­‐‑
mation gathered is not probative of illegal activity.  In particular, Luther critiques the 
return to the biographical core analysis in Cheung CA and the Court of Appeal’s con-­‐‑
clusion  that  the  use  of  the  DRA  was  non-­‐‑intrusive  because  it  was  placed  on  the  power  
company’s property, on the basis that this analysis:
is really all about allowing the police to snoop at will, without authorization 
or indeed any regulation at all, to allow them to obtain grounds to then get 
a warrant. Any information gleaned from any of these methods that ends 
up  in  a  warrant  application  has  the  effect  of  breaching  privacy  and  doing  
an end run around section 8’s Charter requirements. 49
Pomerance  criticizes  the  REP  analysis  on  the  grounds  that  it  “tell[s]  us  that  s.  8  will  
only protect the privacy interest in information if the information is inherently pri-­‐‑
vate.”50    In  essence,  her  view  is  that  the  “biographical  core”  is  merely  a  synonym  for  
the  word  “private.”    Pomerance  then  argues  that  what  is  inherently  private  ultimately  
lies  “in  the  subjective  apprehension  of  the  decision-­‐‑maker.”51  This critique rings true 
even  if  the  minority  judgment  of  Binnie  J.  in  A.M. signals the beginning of the end for 
the biographical core as a foundational concept of the REP analysis in informational 
privacy.    However,  if  Binnie  J.’s  judgment  in  A.M. does indicate that the REP analysis 
is  moving  to  a  more  subjective  focus  on  the  intention  of  the  person  searched  to  keep  
information or places private, then this critique loses some of its force. 
MacKinnon  argues  that  the  case-­‐‑by-­‐‑case  approach  to  s.  8  and  the  lack  of  clear  guid-­‐‑
ing principles breach Canadian’s privacy because this approach fails to prospectively 
49     Glen  Luther,  “Consent  Search  and  Reasonable  Expectation  of  Privacy:  Twin  Barriers  to  the  
Reasonable  Protection  of  Privacy  in  Canada”  (2008)  41  U.B.C.  L.  Rev.  1  at  para.  36.    
50    Renee  M.  Pomerance,  “Shedding  Light  on  the  Nature  of  Heat:  Defining  Privacy  in  the  wake  of  R.  
v.  Tessling”,  (2004)  23  C.R.  (6th)  229  at  233  [Pomerance].
51  Ibid.  at  233.
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guide the use of police power.52  On this account, breaches are inevitable because sub-­‐‑
sequent  litigation  is  the  only  way  to  determine  whether  or  not  the  state  has  commi ed  
a search in violation of a person’s constitutional right.
2. Narrowness 
The narrowness critique of the REP analysis has two parts: one consequential and one 
analytical.  
On  the  consequential  side  of  the  analysis,  Bailey  argues  that  the  jurisprudence  takes  
too narrow a view of informational privacy interests, because it ignores the fact that 
many small pieces of information can be pieced together to create a more revealing 
data set.53    Pomerance  also  makes  this  critique,  and  points  to  the  example  of  “data-­‐‑min-­‐‑
ing” which uses complex computer programs to gather all bits of information available 
on a single individual and assembles them to create a detailed picture of the individual 
involved.  As she describes the phenomenon,
Zero  plus   zero  does   not   always   equal   zero   and,   like   a   jigsaw  puzzle,   a  
very clear picture can emerge when otherwise unintelligible pieces are 
fit  together.     This  process  can  strike  very  poignantly  at  what  we  call   the  
biographical   core.      Yet,   any   one   item   of   information  may   not  meet   the  
threshold for constitutional protection set out in Plant   and   affirmed   in  
Tessling.54
In  other  words,  the  consequences  of  not  finding  a  REP  in  any  particular  case  should  be  
considered in light of the possibility that innocuous pieces of information can become 
part of a revealing whole. 
Turning  to  the  issue  of  analytical  narrowness,  Burkell  points  out  that  empirical  psycho-­‐‑
logical studies suggest that violations of privacy are perceived as less intrusive when 
an objective, third person perspective is used to evaluate the search, and as more intru-­‐‑
sive  when  a  subjective,  first  person  perspective  is  used.    She  argues  that  the  REP  analy-­‐‑
sis should focus more on the perspective of how an average citizen would feel if the 
search happened to them, rather than on whether what was done to someone else was 
reasonable.    Burkell  also  points  out  that  psychological  studies  suggest  that  searches  are  
perceived  to  be  less  intrusive  when  the  outcome  (such  as  the  discovery  of  a  grow-­‐‑op)  is  
known.    Accordingly,  it  is  also  necessary  to  ignore  the  evidence  produced  by  a  search  
at the s. 8 stage in order to prevent the reasonableness of any expectation of privacy 
52    William  MacKinnon  “Tessling,  Brown,  and  A.M.:  Towards  and  Principled  Approach  to  Section  
8”  (2007),  45  Alta.  L.  Rev  79  at  115  [MacKinnon].
53     Jane  Bailey,  “Framed  by  Section  8:  Constitutional  Protection  of  Privacy  in  Canada”  (2008)  50  Can  
J.  Crimin  &  Crim.  Jus.  279  at  302  [Bailey].
54   Pomerance, supra  note  46  at  234-­‐‑35.
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from being reduced.55    Crucially,  Burkell  does  not  advocate  for  a  purely  subjective  test;  
she  argues  only  that  the  first  person  be  used  to  address  objective  reasonableness  (i.e.  
“would  this  intrude  on  our or my privacy”  rather  than  “did  this  intrude  on  their or his 
privacy”)  because  what  is  at  stake  in  every  case  is  the  boundary  of  privacy  available  to  
all Canadians.56  
The presumption of a REP in the home implicitly created in Gomboc answers each of these 
critiques, and closes the gap between the expectations of privacy that Canadians have 
and that which the REP permits them to have.  It pulls the ivy out of the windows. 
III. R. v. GOMBOC: THE FACTS 
In Gomboc,  the  Alberta  Court  of  Appeal  overturned  the  convictions  of  Mr.  Gomboc  for  
producing  marihuana  and  possession  for  the  purposes  of  trafficking.    While  investi-­‐‑
gating  an  unrelated  ma er,   a  police  officer  noticed   that  Mr.  Gomboc’s  house  exhib-­‐‑
ited  signs  consistent  with  the  presence  of  a  grow-­‐‑op.    Two  officers  from  the  drug  unit  
were  assigned  to  investigate,  and  a er  observing  the  home  they  concluded  that  Mr.  
Gomboc’s  house  probably  contained  a  grow-­‐‑op.57    So,  the  officers  asked  Mr.  Gomboc’s  
electrical  utility,  Enmax,  to  place  a  DRA  on  his  power  line.    Enmax  complied.    For  five  
days   the  DRA  gathered   information  on  Mr.  Gomboc’s  power  consumption.     Enmax  
gave the information to the police, who concluded it was consistent with the presence 
of  a  grow-­‐‑op.     They  obtained  a   search  warrant,   found  a  grow-­‐‑op,  and  charged  Mr.  
Gomboc.58 
By  a  2-­‐‑1  majority  the  Court  of  Appeal  overturned  the  accused’s  conviction  and  ordered  
a new trial.  For the majority, Martin J.A. held there was a REP in the information gath-­‐‑
ered by the DRA and that in the absence of prior judicial authorization, the gathering 
and release of the information to the police was an unreasonable search.59  In dissent, 
O’Brien  J.A.  held  there  was  no  REP  in  the  DRA  information.60      In  so  doing  he  stuck  
closely to the existing jurisprudence and to the concept of the core biographical infor-­‐‑
mation in particular.
There  are  three  key  sources  of  divergence  between  the  majority  and  the  dissent:  first,  
whether the information collected by the DRA could fall within the accused’s biograph-­‐‑
ical  core;  second,  whether  Enmax  acted  as  an  agent  of  the  state  in  using  the  DRA  at  the  
police’s  request;  and  third,  whether  the  law  and  contract  governing  the  relationship  be-­‐‑
55    Jacquelyn  Burkell,  “Deciding  for  Ourselves:  Some  Thoughts  on  the  Psychology  of  Assessing  
Reasonable  Expectations  of  Privacy”  (2008),  50  Can  J.  Crimin  &  Crim.  Jus.  308  at  313,  323  and  322  
[Burkell].
56   Ibid.  at  317.  
57  Gomboc, supra  note  8  at  paras.  3-­‐‑4.
58  Ibid. at para. 5.
59  Ibid. at para. 8.
60   Ibid. at para. 95.
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tween Enmax and the accused could prevent the accused from claiming an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information.  The reasoning of the dissent on 
these issues exhibits the problems of consequential and analytical narrowness which 
emerged from the earlier jurisprudence.  In each case the majority’s implicit presump-­‐‑
tion of a REP in the home solves the problems that have plagued the REP analysis.
IV. R. v. GOMBOC: AN ANALYSIS
1. The Biographical Core
Despite the cases cautioning against limiting the REP analysis to the biographical core, 
the concept raised its head in both the majority and the dissenting reasons in Gomboc. 
Comparing the application of the concept in the two judgments reveals the majority’s 
implicit creation of a presumption of a REP in the home. 
In  his  dissent,  O’Brien  J.A.  held  that  he  was  bound  by  the  SCC’s  holding  in  Plant that 
there was no REP in electricity records.61  Although he did note that the law has long 
recognized the sanctity of the home, he noted that the mere fact that the home was 
involved did not relieve the Court from the need to balance the interests of the state 
against those of the citizen.62  
O’Brien  J.A.  then  referred  to  the  expert  evidence  of  Sergeant  Morrison,  who  testified  
that he could not determine from the DRA records how many people lived at the 
house,  when   they  were  home,  or   anything  about   their   “lifestyle,  personal  habits  or  
beliefs.”63    O’Brien  J.A.  agreed  with  the  Saskatchewan  Court  of  Appeal  in  Cheung that 
the  DRA  “data  did  not  disclose  any  intimate  details  of  the  accused’s  lifestyle  or  core  
biographical data, as it was essentially similar in nature to the electrical consumption 
records in Plant.”64 
A er   noting   that   Binnie   J.’s   judgment   in  A.M.   opened   the   possibility   that   the   REP  
analysis  could  extend  beyond  the  biographical  core,  O’Brien  J.A.  went  on  to  examine  
some  “further   factors.”     However,   it   appears   that   these  other   two   factors  examined  
are  plucked  straight  from  Tessling.    The  first  factor  appears  to  be  a  restatement  of  the  
biographical  core.    Specifically,  O’Brien  J.A.  agreed  with  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  Cheung 
that  the  nature  and  quality  of  the  information  was  insufficient  to  support  a  conclusive  
inference   that   there  was  a  grow-­‐‑op   in   the  house.65  However, the passage which he 
quotes   from  that  case  specifically  relies  on   the  concept  of   the  biographical  core,   the  
very  concept  which  the  “further  factors”  should  be  moving  beyond.    O’Brien  J.A.  con-­‐‑
61   Ibid.  at  paras.  68,  70.
62   Ibid.  at  para.  62.
63   Ibid.  at  para.  69.
64   Ibid.  at  para.  71-­‐‑72.
65   Ibid.  at  paras.  75-­‐‑76.  
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cluded the following:
I  see  li le  difference  in  the  privacy  interests  possessed  by  residents  between  
the   pa erns   of   heat   distribution   generated   from  within   and   emanating  
from  their  residences  as  externally  measured,  and  the  pa erns  of  electrical  
utility  usage  within  the  residences  as  externally  measured.    Like  the  FLIR  
image,   the   disclosure   of   the   DRA   graph   scarcely   affects   the   “dignity,  
integrity and autonomy of the person whose house is subject of” the graph 
(Tessling,  para.  63).66
In   this  passage,   it  appears   that   the  focus  on  the   intent  of   the  person  affected  by  the  
search  in  Binnie  J.’s  judgment  in  A.M.  collapsed  back  into  the  concept  of  the  biographi-­‐‑
cal core which it sought to leave behind.  That point aside, this passage seems to say 
that the information is not private, because it is not private.   
O’Brien  J.A.  went  on  to  examine  the  intrusiveness  of  the  search.    This  analysis  was  not  
undertaken  with   regard   to   the  perspective  of   the  person  being  searched.     Rather,   it  
focuses on the desirability of catching criminals:
Nor, in my view, does the police technique in obtaining the graph undermine 
privacy to a greater extent than having an airplane overly [sic] the residence 
to  take  a  “heat”  picture  […]  Such  investigative  measures  may  properly  be  
used by the authorities to detect criminal activity, which otherwise may 
not be discernable, without encroachment on the constitutional rights of 
citizens to be free of unreasonable searches.67
Burkell’s   critiques  are  aptly  applicable   to   this  passage.     The   intrusiveness  of   the   in-­‐‑
vestigation is measured relative to the detection of crime, rather than to whether or 
not it actually invades the privacy of all Canadians.  Whether or not crime is detected 
should  be  subsidiary  to  the  question  of  “would  it  be  an  invasion  of  my  privacy  if  the  
police could use my power company to monitor my power consumption whenever 
they  wanted?”    
For  O’Brien  J.A.,  the  subjective  expectation  of  privacy  is  overwhelmed  by  an  objective  
analysis of the nature and quality of the information obtained and the technique used 
to  gather  it.    While  this  analysis  follows  the  framework  laid  down  by  the  jurisprudence,  
it does, as Pomerance argues, amount to saying that information is private when it is 
private.68  Furthermore, as Luther points out, it amounts to saying that any information 
that is not particularly probative of criminal activity is not protected by s. 8.69 
In Patrick,  Binnie  J.  reaffirmed  that  individuals  are  presumed  to  have  a  subjective  ex-­‐‑
66   Ibid. at para. 77.  
67   Ibid. at para. 78 .
68   Pomerance, supra  note  50  at  233.
69   Luther, supra  note  49  at  para.  35.    
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pectation of privacy in information relating to activity within their homes.70    A er  re-­‐‑
ferring to this presumption, Martin J.A. began his analysis of the DRA information and 
whether it fell within a biographical core.  He distinguished Tessling on the basis that a 
DRA was more revealing and intrusive than a FLIR.71  Martin J.A. reasoned that: 
Notwithstanding the evidence of the police expert, Sgt. Morrison, DRA 
information  must,  as  a  ma er  of  common  sense,  also  disclose  biographical  
or  private  information;  for  example,  the  approximate  number  of  occupants,  
when  they  are  present  in  the  home,  and  when  they  are  awake  or  asleep.72
In so holding, he cites the judgment of Abella J.A., as she then was, in Tessling, and the 
dissenting judgment of McLachlin J., as she then was, in Plant. 73  The former judgment 
was  overruled  by  the  SCC  while  the  la er  was  a  dissent.    Not  only  does  this  holding  
swim  against  the  flow  of  precedent,  it  also  drives  against  the  current  of  the  evidence  in  
the case, as Martin J.A. concedes.  
Martin J.A. went on to hold that the information gathered by the DRA did disclose 
core biographical information, but he also held in the alternative that there would be 
a REP in the information even if it did not relate to a biographical core of information 
because, as in A.M.,  it  was  “reasonably  intended  to  remain  private.”74   
Martin  J.A.’s  reasoning  on  this  point  is  illuminated  by  his  opening  remarks:
It  has  been  famously  said  that  “the  state  has  no  business  in  the  bedrooms  
of the nation.”  The actual prohibition is much broader: in our society, 
absent exigent circumstances, the state has no business in the homes of the 
nation without invitation or judicial authorization.  
This expectation of privacy in one’s home is encompassed within the 
constitutional protection to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.  
Indeed,   it   ranks   among   the   primary   objectives   of   s.   8   of   the  Charter   of  
Rights and Freedoms.75
This  statement  by  itself  it  does  not  address  the  analysis  set  down  in  legal  framework,  
namely, whether in all the circumstances, there should be a REP in the information 
generated by a DRA.76  Instead, it presumes a REP in the home.  For Martin  J.A. the sub-­‐‑
jective expectation of privacy in the home, and, by extension, in information relating 
to the home, is a fundamental part of Canadian society, and is presumptively worthy 
70  Patrick, supra note  7  at  para.  37.    
71  Gomboc, supra  note  8  at  para.  16.    
72  Ibid. at para. 17.
73   R. v. Tessling  (2003),  63  O.R.  (3d)  1  (Ont.  C.A.)  at  para.  69;  Plant, supra  note  14  at  302-­‐‑303.
74   Gomboc, supra  note  8  at  paras.  17-­‐‑18.
75  Ibid.  at  paras.  9-­‐‑10.    
76   Tessling, supra  note  3  at  paras.  31-­‐‑32.  
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of legal protection.  In retrospect, these comments explain Martin J.A.’s reasoning on 
the biographical core.  It could be argued that this approach is no less circular than 
the old biographical core approach, since the point where his Lordship starts has a 
lot to do with where he ends.  However, at the very least, this presumption provides 
the analysis with a clear starting premise, which is a preferable option to the impreci-­‐‑
sion of the concept of the biographical core.  More importantly, this premise closes the 
gap between privacy that the courts say Canadians expect, and the privacy that a REP 
analysis permits.
2. Enmax as a State Agent
Martin J.A.’s analysis on this point remains squarely focused on the home as the place 
under surveillance.  In so doing, he expands the subjective presumption of privacy 
in  the  home  into  the  objective  part  of  the  test.    A er  examining  the  portion  of  Patrick 
(paragraph  40)  in  which  Binnie  J.  noted  that  most  of  the  factors  in  that  case  pointed  
towards a REP, since the information gathered dealt with what was happening in a 
private  home,  Martin  J.A.  held  as  follows:  “the  point  remains  that  the  police  wanted  
the  DRA  information  to  find  out  what  was  happening  in  the  appellant’s  home  -­‐‑-­‐‑  a  place  
where the appellant’s expectation of privacy was high and objectively reasonable.”77 
This analysis departs from Tessling by focusing on where the information was gath-­‐‑
ered.  Again, Martin J.A. presumes a REP in information related to the home.  
In the following paragraph, Martin J.A. goes even further in creating the presumption 
of a REP in the home, holding as follows:
In my opinion, the expectation of privacy extends beyond simply the 
information as to the timing and the amount of electricity used.  It is also 
objectively  reasonable  to  expect  that  the  utility  would  not  be  co-­‐‑opted  by  
the police to gather additional information of interest only to the police, 
without judicial authorization.  Indeed, I expect that the reasonable, 
informed citizen would be gravely concerned, and would object to the 
state being allowed to use a utility to spy on a homeowner in this way.78
Martin J.A. went on to say,
In my opinion, the Regulations must be strictly construed, and not 
interpreted to imply the homeowner’s consent in allowing the utility to 
gather, at the behest of the state, information that is not useful to his or her 
relationship with the utility. The Regulations cannot mean that the utility 
can be used, without judicial authorization, as an investigative arm of the 
police to gather evidence about what is happening inside the home, unless 
the consumer has forbidden it.[…]If it were otherwise, the police could 
77  Gomboc, supra note 8 at paras. 19, 20.   
78  Ibid. at para. 21.   
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recruit any agency with limited access to a home to exploit that access to 
gather  information  for  them.    For  example,  the  mailman  to  look  into  the  
windows  while  at  the  house  delivering  mail  and  report  his  observations;  
or the cable TV provider to report the viewing habits and preferences 
of the subscriber.  Such unauthorized state surveillance of its citizens is 
offensive  to  the  basic  tenets  of  our  society  and  would  render  the  protection  
of a reasonable expectation of privacy over one’s home, illusory.79
The presumption of a REP in the home which informs the above passages also expands 
the focus of the s. 8 analysis beyond the facts of the case at bar.  The judgment of Martin 
J.A.  recognizes  that  what  is  at  stake  in  the  case  practically  extends  far  beyond  the  rela-­‐‑
tionship between the accused and Enmax.  This expansion answers the consequential 
narrowness  critiques  of  Bailey  and  Pomerance.    Furthermore,  his  reasons  on  this  point  
also  avoid  the  analytical  narrowness  which  Burkell  warns  against.    The  adoption  of  the  
presumption of a REP in the home broadens the perspective of Martin J.A’s analysis 
so  that  he  considers  not  only  the  privacy  interest  of  Mr.  Gomboc,  but  also  the  privacy  
interest of all Canadians.  
By  contrast,  O’Brien  J.A.  held  that  Enmax  was  not  acting  as  a  state  agent,  because  it  
had  a  “legitimate  self  interest  in  discovering  and  deterring  the  criminal  activity  of  the  
accused. Enmax was not instructed by the police, but rather its employees voluntarily 
cooperated.”80   
The line between being instructed to do something by the police and voluntarily com-­‐‑
plying with a police request is a very thin one.81  Furthermore, the test for whether 
or not a third party performing a search is a state agent is whether or not the search 
would  have  occurred  “but  for  the  involvement  of  the  police.”82  Whatever self interest 
Enmax  may  have  had  in  detecting  Mr.  Gomboc’s  grow-­‐‑op,  it  would  have  not  used  the  
DRA absent the police request.  On this basis, Enmax clearly is a state agent.  Moreover, 
underlying  O’Brien   J.A.’s   analysis   are   the   inherent  dangers   in   a   case-­‐‑by-­‐‑case,   a er-­‐‑
the-­‐‑fact  test  for  the  protection  of  privacy.    As  MacKinnon  points  out,  the  information  
is already in the hands of the state.83  The police have done their job without prior 
knowledge  of  whether  or  not  they  needed  a  warrant,  and  Enmax  helped  them  along.  
We want the police to do their job and we want society to help them.  In this situation, 
it is impossible for the REP analysis as it stands to either bend in favour of the police 
and  against  privacy,  or   to   result   in   a  public  outcry  by   le ing   the  bad  guys  go   free.  
Furthermore,  framing  the  analysis  as  “the  detection  of  crime”  rather  than  the  “deter-­‐‑
mination of privacy” may result in a lowering of the perceived reasonableness of the 
expectation of privacy.84  This potential consequence is troubling, given that the limits 
79  Ibid.  at  paras.  24,  25.    
80  Ibid. at para. 101.   
81  R. v. Therens,  [1985]  1  S.C.R.  61  at  644,  45  C.R.  (3d)  97.
82  R. v. M. (M.R.),  [1998]  3  S.C.R.  393,  at  para.  29,  20  C.R.  (5th)  197  [M. (M.R.)].  
83   MacKinnon, supra note 52 at 115. 
84     Burkell,  supra  note  49  at  313.
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of  the  privacy  of  all  Canadians  are  at  stake.
Martin J.A.’s implicit presumption would escape this dilemma in future cases.  A pre-­‐‑
sumption  of  a  REP  in  the  home  would  let   the  police  know  where  they  stand:  when  
gathering information that can be used to draw inferences about what is inside the 
home,  police  had  best  seek  a  warrant.    Furthermore,  this  presumption  would  place  the  
onus on the state to justify the breach.  This onus would act as barrier to the adjudica-­‐‑
tor considering the result of the state action when evaluating its impact on Canadians’ 
privacy.  If what the state did was presumptively wrong, then the outcome is of less 
weight than it would be if the state action was unobjectionable until an individual 
proved otherwise.  
The presumption of a REP in the home, which Martin J.A. implicitly creates, also draws 
on  a  deeper  fount  of  s.  8  wisdom  by  looking  back  to  Hunter.  The REP analysis is meant 
to be the threshold test which determines whether or not conduct is a search for the 
purposes of s. 8.  The second part of the analysis is whether or not the search was con-­‐‑
ducted in a reasonable manner, at which point the presumption against warrantless 
searches is relevant.85  Martin J.A. reaches across the divide between REP and the rea-­‐‑
sonableness of the search and uses the presumption from Hunter – that a warrantless 
search is unreasonable – to inform his s. 8 analysis.  In essence, his reasoning seems 
to be as follows: how can a person not have an objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their activities in their own home, when the law states that an unauthorized 
search is prima facie  unreasonable?    This  reasoning  ignores  the  need  to  define  a  search,  
which  is  of  course  the  whole  purpose  of  the  REP  analysis.    It  simply  says,  “if  you  want  
to gather information about my home, get a warrant.”  However, it also avoids all the 
difficulties   that  accompany  a  post-facto   case-­‐‑by-­‐‑case  analysis   for  all  privacy   interests  
related to the home.
3. The Objective Reasonableness of the Expectation of Privacy
The   third   fundamental  point   of   contention  between  Martin   J.A.   and  O’Brien   J.A.   is  
whether the Regulations and the Tariff governing the relationship between the accused 
and  Enmax  ended  Mr.  Gomboc’s  REP  in  any  data  gathered  or  held  by  Enmax.     The  
Regulations provided, in part:
10   (3)   Customer   information   may   be   disclosed   without   the   customer’s  
consent   to   the   following   specified   persons   or   for   any   of   the   following  
purposes: 
(e) for the purpose of complying with a subpoena, warrant or order issued 
or made by a court, person or body having jurisdiction to require or compel 
the production of information or with a rule of court that relates to the 
production  of  information;  
85  R. v. Collins,  [1987]  1  S.C.R.  265  at  278,  56  C.R.  (3d)  193.    See  also  Hunter, supra note  4  at  156-­‐‑61.
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(f)   to   a   peace   officer   for   the   purpose   of   investigating   an   offence   if   the  
disclosure is not contrary to the express request of the customer.86 
The  Enmax  Distribution  Tariff  contained  the  contractual  terms  governing  the  accused’s  
relationship with Enmax.  Part 17.1 provided, inter alia:  “Information  may  be   trans-­‐‑
ferred without consent in the case of legal, regulatory or law enforcement require-­‐‑
ments (e.g., transfer of electricity information for drug investigations).”87  
O’Brien  J.A.  held  that  the  Regulations and the Tariff prevented a REP from arising in 
the data gathered by the DRA, because both documents expressly contemplated the 
disclosure of information to the police for investigative purposes.88  He reasoned that 
there could be no REP where a law (the Regulations) provided for disclosure without 
consent unless the customer requested that the information not be disclosed.  Since Mr. 
Gomboc  did  not  request  that  his  electrical  consumption  data  remain  confidential,  he  
could not have a REP.89
In his analysis of the Tariff,  O’Brien  J.A.  held  that  the  word  “requirements”  could  not  
mean compulsion, because there were other provisions stating that information would 
be disclosed if it was sought under a subpoena or a warrant.  He also placed great 
weight on the fact that the Tariff  specifically  stated  that  information  would  be  disclosed  
to assist the police with drug investigations.90     O’Brien  J.A.  did  not  address  whether  
the  word  “information”  included  “requests  to  generate  information,”  which  was  the  
situation in Gomboc.
O’Brien  J.A.’s  interpretation  can  be  criticized  for  both  consequential  and  analytical  nar-­‐‑
rowness.  He fails to consider the broad consequences of interpreting the Regulations 
to permit the police to use the utility to not only release information, but also to gath-­‐‑
er  it  at  the  behest  of  the  police.    As  Bailey  and  Pomerance  argue,  there  is  nothing  to  
stop  the  police  from  gathering  DRA  data  at  will  and  combining  it  with  other  non-­‐‑pro-­‐‑
tected pieces of information to create a fuller picture of the life of the person under 
surveillance.91  
Analytically,  O’Brien   J.A.   remains   focused  on  whether  what  was  done   to  detect  Mr.  
Gomboc’s  “criminal  activity”  was  acceptable.92  This phrase suggests that he falls into the 
two  analytical  quagmires  identified  by  Burkell.    First,  he  frames  the  issue  as  whether  the  
privacy  of  someone  else  is  at  stake,  rather  than  the  privacy  of  all  Canadians.    Second,  he  
undertakes  this  analysis  without  ignoring  the  result  of  the  surveillance,  and  allows  his  
analysis  to  be  influenced  subtly  by  the  fact  that  Mr.  Gomboc  was  violating  the  law.93   
86   Code of Conduct Regulations,  Alta.  Reg.  160/2003,  [Regulations].
87  Re ENMAX Power Corp.,  2003  CarswellAlta  2143  (Alta.  E.U.B.),  Appendix  B,  Part  17.1  [Tariff].
88  Gomboc, supra note 8 at para. 95.  
89  Ibid.  at  para.  86.
90  Ibid.  at  para.  93.
91    Bailey,  supra  note  53  at  302;  Pomerance, supra  note  46  at  234-­‐‑35.
92  Gomboc, supra note 8 at para. 101.
93     Burkell,  supra  note  55  at  309  and  321.    
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As noted above, Martin J.A. began his reasoning by implicitly holding that there was a 
REP  in  the  home.    He  then  went  on  to  hold  that  it  was  “objectively  reasonable  to  expect  
that  the  utility  would  not  be  co-­‐‑opted  by  the  police  to  gather  additional  information  of  
interest only to the police, without judicial authorization.”94  This holding shows that 
he adopts a broader perspective in his REP analysis by considering the interests of all 
Canadians, and he has ignored the results of the search.  It seems that Martin J.A.’s 
initial presumption of a REP in the home provided him with the guidance necessary to 
avoid the analytical pitfalls that can pepper a s. 8 analysis.  
Martin J.A. held, following obiter   from   the   judgment  of  Binnie   J.   in  Patrick, that the 
licence granted to Enmax to come onto the accused’s property could not be extended 
to permit Enmax to assist in a police investigation.95  He distinguished Plant on the 
basis  that  the  police  asked  Enmax  to  generate  new  information,  rather  than  to  release  
information that the customer would expect the utility to have.96  Martin J.A. went to 
on hold that the Regulations  only  permi ed  Enmax  to  share  existing  information:
The Regulations cannot mean that the utility can be used, without judicial 
authorization, as an investigative arm of the police to gather evidence about 
what is happening inside the home, unless the consumer has forbidden it.  
Trespassing on a homeowner’s property is conduct the police themselves 
are  not  permi ed  to  engage  in  (see  Kokesch, Evans), and I do not understand 
that the Regulations were intended, nor constitutionally able, to empower 
police agents to do what they themselves can not legally do.97
What is objectionable is not the gathering of the information per se, but the gathering 
of the information about what is going on inside the home.  Implicitly, Martin J.A. assumes 
that information related to what goes on in the home is subject to a REP, and this pre-­‐‑
sumption guides him in restrictively interpreting the Regulations.
4. Gomboc: A Summary
O’Brien  J.A.  keeps  close  to  the  analytical  framework  laid  down  in  the  jurisprudence.  
He   follows   the   twists   and   turns   of   precedent,   straight   into   the   home.      By   contrast,  
Martin J.A.’s analysis is underpinned by a presumption of a REP in the home.  This 
presumption covers both what goes on within the four walls of a home and the gather-­‐‑
ing of information outside the home which can be used to draw inferences about what 
is going on inside the home.  There is a solid foundation for this presumption, namely 
the presumption of a subjective expectation of privacy found in the earlier case law. 
However,   the  presumption  of  Martin   J.A.   also   significantly  alters   the   totality  of   the  
circumstances test.  It cuts away some of the branches.  
94   Gomboc, supra note 8 at para. 21.  
95  Ibid. at para. 22.
96   Ibid.  at  paras.  23,  24.
97  Ibid.  at  para.  24.
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Rather than requiring an individual to prove that his or her expectation of privacy was 
reasonable, the presumption of a REP in the home places the burden on the Crown to 
prove that an expectation of privacy in the home was unreasonable.  The presump-­‐‑
tion also gives greater weight to the expectations of the person searched.  However 
the  perspective  of  the  person  searched  is  no  longer  purely  subjective;  rather,  it  is  the  
perspective of every Canadian.  The obiter in Tessling, that the subjective expectation 
of privacy is derived from social norms and not individual caprice, is a precursor to 
this  change  in  perspective.    Not  only  does  this  shi   in  perspective  reduce  the  risks  of  
consequential and analytical narrowness, it also reconnects the s. 8 analysis with the 
basic values of individual autonomy, integrity and dignity by giving substantive force 
to the presumption of a subjective expectation of privacy in the home which has thus 
far  had  li le  impact  on  the  jurisprudence.    Essentially,  the  presumption  of  a  REP  in  the  
home creates a legal space where Canadians can assume that they will be free to be 
themselves.  
The big question is whether this pruning will reshape the landscape or whether the 
prior  jurisprudence  will  grow  back.
V. POST-GOMBOC CASES
To date, only four cases have considered the judgment in Gomboc.  Three have treated 
the decision favourably, while one has not.  The cases deal with Gomboc both in the 
context  of  s.  8  and  in  the  context  of  the  exclusion  of  evidence  in  s.  24(2)  applications  
under  the  Charter.    The  s.  24(2)  cases  are  likely  less  significant  than  the  s.  8  cases,  since  
the  s.  24(2)  cases  deal  superficially  with  the  importance  of  the  privacy  interest  in  the  
home, and not the legal force of the presumption created in Gomboc.  The favourable 
cases  will  be  considered  first.
1. R. v. Ngai
In R. v. Ngai, the Alberta Court of Appeal heard a case which the Crown conceded was 
not distinguishable from Gomboc.98     The  Court  confirmed  Gomboc and overruled the 
trial judge’s decision that the use of a DRA without a warrant did not violate s. 8.99  The 
Court  ultimately  ruled  that  the  evidence  should  not  be  excluded  under  s.  24(2).    It  was  
held that the breach of the accused’s Charter  right  was  not  flagrant  or  abusive  because  
the  state  of  the  law  regarding  DRAs  was  unse led  at  the  time  of  the  DRA  search.100  The 
decision in Ngai  probably  would  have  been  different  had  the  DRA  search  been  made  
a er  the  decision  in  Gomboc, since such a search would have shown considerably less 
regard for the accused’s Charter rights.  
98  R. v. Ngai,  2010  ABCA  10,  at  para.  25,  2010  CarswellAlta  170  [Ngai].
99  Ibid.  at  para.  30.
100  Ibid.  at  para.  40.    
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In assessing the impact of the breach on the Charter right of the accused, the Court 
found that the breach did not seriously entrench upon it.  Two reasons supported this 
finding.    First,  the  house  was  not  the  accused’s  residence;  in  fact,  it  was  not  inhabited  
at all.  This fact suggests that the question of whether or not a house is a home may be-­‐‑
come  the  central  issue  in  future  grow-­‐‑op  cases  if  the  SCC  affirms  Gomboc.    Second,  the  
Court  noted  that  the  information  did  not  relate  to  the  accused’s  “biographical  core.”101 
This reasoning is troubling, because it is not clear whether the Court was returning to 
a Tessling-­‐‑style  analysis,  focusing  on  the  nature  of  the  DRA  information  itself  at  the  s.  
24(2)  stage,  or  if  it  merely  was  using  Tessling’s terminology to say that the information 
did not relate to the home, and therefore was less worthy of protection.  Furthermore, 
one wonders how far a presumption of a REP in the home would go towards protect-­‐‑
ing Canadians’ privacy if the concept of the biographical core was transplanted to the 
s.  24(2)  analysis.
2. R. v. LaFontaine
In R. v. Lafontaine, the police found marihuana while searching for the accused’s broth-­‐‑
er in their parents’ home.102  The Court held that the marihuana should be excluded 
under  s.  24(2).103  In considering the impact of the breach on the Charter rights of the ac-­‐‑
cused,  the  Court  noted:  “Here,  what  amounted  to  a  warrantless  search  took  place  in  a  
private  dwelling  where  it  is  admi ed  the  Applicant  Ma hew  Lafontaine  had  a  reason-­‐‑
able expectation of privacy.”104  The Court then cited paragraphs 9 and 10 of Gomboc, 
and  held,  “I  accept  that  the  protection  of  one’s  expectation  of  privacy  in  one’s  home  is  
an  important  Charter  objective.    Citizens  are  to  be  le   in  peace  by  the  state  unless  there  
is  sufficient  justification  to  intrude.”105 
This decision endorses the presumption of an REP in the home.  However, it may be 
an  endorsement  of  limited  effect,  given  that  the  REP  issue  was  conceded  on  the  facts  
of that case.
3. R v. Cuttell
In R.   v.   Cu ell, the police sought information about the accused’s name and ad-­‐‑
dress from his internet service provider during a child pornography investigation.106 
Ultimately, the Court held that there was a breach of s. 8 but that the evidence should 
not  be  excluded  under  s.  24(2).107     
In  finding  a  breach  of  s.  8,  the  Court  cited  paragraphs  24  and  25  of  Martin  J.A.’s  judg-­‐‑
101  Ibid.  at  para.  43.
102  R. v. Lafontaine,  2009  CarswellOnt  8444  at  paras.  3,  6,  9-­‐‑10,  (December  3,  2009),  08-­‐‑0645  (Ont.  S.  
Ct. J.) [Lafontaine].
103   Ibid. at para. 29.
104   Ibid. at para 25.
105  Ibid.  at  para.  26.
106   R.  v.  Cu ell,  2009  ONCJ  471  at  para.  1,  247  C.C.C.  (3d)  424  [Cu ell].
107  Ibid.  at  para.  3.    
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ment in Gomboc before noting:
Although the privacy concerns in Gomboc  are  admi edly  much  stronger  
than in this case because they relate to active creation of electronic 
records that invade the privacy of the home, I believe the clear caution to 
police about using a third party to act as an unauthorized state agent is 
nonetheless valid.108
This passage endorses Gomboc’s presumption of a REP in the home.
4. R. v. Luong
R. v. Luong closely parallels Gomboc  on  its  facts,  but  adopts  the  reasoning  of  O’Brien  
J.A.’s dissent in the result.  A DRA was installed at the request of the police while they 
investigated  a  suspected  grow-­‐‑op,  and  the  information  which  the  DRA  generated  was  
used to obtain a warrant.109  The Court concluded:
As in [Tessling],   in   the   case   at   bar,   DRA   technology   did   not   affect   an  
individual’s dignity, integrity or autonomy and could not reasonably be 
considered to touch at the biographical core of the accused persons or 
reveal intimate details of their lifestyle, individually or together.  I am in 
agreement  with  the  dissenting  opinion  of  Justice  O’Brien  in  Gomboc. 110
The result in Luong  illustrates  the  methodological  break  between  the  majority  and  the  
dissent in Gomboc.    O’Brien  J.A.’s  reasoning  follows  the  existing  jurisprudence  closely  
and  is  compelling  if  the  key  factor  in  the  REP  analysis  is  the  biographical  core.    On  the  
other hand, Martin J.A.’s approach is only compelling if the underlying presumption 
takes  hold.    The  Court  in  Luong  clearly  did  not  accept  this  premise;  indeed,  it  made  no  
reference to the level of privacy that could be expected in a home.  However, this rejec-­‐‑
tion may not be as harsh as it seems, since there was some evidence before the Court 
that could lead to the conclusion that the house was not being used as a home.111
CONCLUSION
On the one hand, the jurisprudence says that it is presumptively reasonable for 
Canadians to expect privacy in their own homes.  Privacy is a normative standard, and 
privacy in the home is something which Canadians are presumed to expect.  Unless 
Canadians are unreasonable, then the expectation of privacy in the home is reasonable. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  totality  of  the  circumstances  test  o en  overrides  this  expecta-­‐‑
108  Ibid.  at  para.  54.    
109  R. v. Luong & Phung, 2010  ONSC  84  at  paras.  5  and  10,  2010  CarswellOnt  86  [Luong].
110  Ibid.  at  paras.  27-­‐‑28.
111  Ibid. at para. 17.  
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tion,  and   in   the  process  analyzes  privacy  circularly,  narrowly,  and  a er  breaches  of  
privacy have occurred.  The concept of the biographical core, if it remains a part of law, 
also  draws  a ention  away  from  the  reality  that  people  need  their  own  space  if  they  are  
to  pursue  self-­‐‑fulfillment.    The  legal  ivy  has  grown  into  the  house.    Presuming  a  REP  in  
the home, and in information related to the home, as Martin J.A. did in Gomboc, would 
address  each  of  these  critiques.    Most  importantly,  it  would  make  the  law  as  a  whole  
consistent with the privacy expectations which, according to the courts, Canadians 
already  have:  would  that  not  be  reasonable?
When the Supreme Court of Canada renders its decision in Gomboc,  it  may  affirm  the  
established s. 8 analysis, adopt the approach of Martin J.A., or create a new approach. 
I  have  spent  my  ink  analyzing  the  ways  in  which  the  current  approach  to  s.  8  has  been  
used to reduce the privacy which Canadians expect in their homes.  If this presumption 
takes  hold,  the  next  question  is  how  it  would  affect  the  state’s  power  to  legitimately  
investigate  ma ers  connected  to  a  home.
A presumption of a REP in the home is not necessarily incompatible with the need of 
the state to detect crime.  Perhaps the appropriate response would be to permit war-­‐‑
rants to be issued on a lower standard than reasonable and probable grounds, but to 
retain the requirement for prior authorization.  Warrants for information relating to 
the home could be issued on the basis of reasonable suspicion, the standard adopted 
by  Binnie  J.  in  A.M.  for  sniff  searches.    Although,  given  that  investigations  of  the  home  
are  not  made  in  situations  where  the  “the  police  are  generally  required  to  take  quick  
action  guided  by  on-­‐‑the-­‐‑spot  observations,”  it  seems  difficult  to  justify  dropping  the  
requirement for prior authorization.112  The police would still have access to their in-­‐‑
vestigative tools, but the use of these tools would be subject to judicial oversight before 
any search occurred. 
However, I leave a precise examination of how to structure the law of search and sei-­‐‑
zure in response to the creation of a presumption of a REP in the home for another 
time, or another author.  
112  A.M., supra note  13  at  para  90.
